Next stop: Langton and Lewis on humility

Prof. Chalmers,

Profs. Ted Sider and L.A. Paul tell me that Kant's metaphysics, especially his phenomenal/noumenal distinction, have fallen on hard times of late. I'mtrying to figure out why. Kant's explanation of abstract objects as the result of low-level mental reflexes seems more plausible than Lewisianpossible worlds, and it requires only a single primitive, "distinction" as a mental function. Are mind/body problems what hold up Kant these days? Is itthe taint of innate ideas? Any pointers?


yours,
Chad Whitacre

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no idea, really. i think people identify kant's metaphysics mainly with transcendental idealism, which they find implausible. ingeneral "veil of perception" views have fallen on hard times. there is still sympathy here and there, though -- e.g. lewis's ramseyanhumility is quite reminiscent of kantian humility.

best,

djc.

"Ramseyan humility" refers to anessay by the late David Lewis, father of possible worlds, forthcoming in a book furthering the so-called "Canberra Plan." And from what I can tell, Rae Langtonwrote the book on Kantian humility, of which Lewis himself said:

I leave it to others more qualified than I am to argue about whether Langton's Kant is the historical Kant. Whether he is or not, the case he makes for our irremediable ignorance of the intrinsic properties of substances is extremely interesting and, in my opinion, something very like his conclusion is true. Langton's book makes a major contribution not only to historical scholarship but also to metaphysics and epistemology.

Feed back to Chad Whitacre.